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ABSTRACT
An incremental semantics for a logic with dynamic binding is developed on the basis of a variable free notation
for dynamic logic. The variable free indexing mechanism guarantees that active registers are never overwritten
by new quantier actions. The resulting system has the same expressive power as Dynamic Predicate Logic or
Discourse Representation Theory, but comes with a more well behaved consequence relation. A calculus for
dynamic reasoning with anaphora is presented and its soundness and completeness are established. Incremental
dynamic logic provides an explicit account of anaphoric context and yields new insight into the dynamics of
anaphoric linking in reasoning.
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1. Updating Anaphoric Contexts
In recent developments of natural language semantics, problems of pronominal reference and anaphoric
linking have inspired logicians to a dynamic turn in natural language semantics. This started with
Discourse Representation Theory (Kamp [15]) and File Change Semantics (Heim [13]), and various
attempts at rational reconstruction of these proposals, with Barwise [3] and Groenendijk and Stokhof
[11] as the most prominent ones. The gist of these proposals is that the static variable binding regime
from standard predicate logic gets replaced by a dynamic regime, where meanings are viewed as
relations between variable states in a model.
In the original version of the ‘dynamic shift’, the basic ingredients are contexts and constraints on
contexts. A Kamp-style representation for a piece of text (or: discourse) looks basically like this:
context
constraints
on
context
2The informal picture of how the information conveyed by a piece of text grows is that of ‘updating’
of representation structures:
context
constraints
on
context
−!
new context
new constraints
on
context
This picture can only be made to work if we make sure that the contexts are represented smartly.
Contexts are essentially sets of variables: a context just is a list of dynamically bound variables. These
variables represent the antecedents which are available in any extension of that context. Embedded
contexts (contexts occurring inside the constraints on a given context) and extensions of contexts
(representing extensions of anaphoric possibilities) should always employ fresh variables, for if they
do not, existing anaphoric possibilities get blocked o by destructive value assignment.
The rational reconstructions of dynamic discourse representation given by Barwise [3] and Groenendijk
and Stokhof [11] essentially represent introduction of new antecedents by means of random assignment
to a variable. The meaning of 9x becomes the relation between variable states f; g with the property
that f and g dier at most in their x value:
f [[9x]]g i f [x]g:
This does indeed solve the problem of how to use dynamic scoping of variables to account for un-
bounded anaphoric linkings, but it does not give a rational reconstruction of the fact that discourse
representation is supposed to work incrementally.
What one would like is illustrated by the following example, where we assume an initial representation
for the sentence ‘A man entered’, which gets updated by subsequent processing of ‘A woman entered’,
and next of ‘He smiled at her.’
x
Mx
Ex
! ‘A woman entered’ !
x y
Mx
Ex
Wy
Ey
! ‘He smiled at her’ !
x y
Mx
Ex
Wy
Ey
Sxy
In a rational reconstruction of this, one would assume that the sentences to be added to the existing
representation have a representation of their own, so one would get something like:
x
Mx
Ex +
y
My
Ey =
x y
Mx
Ex
Wy
Ey
Problem: what happens if we get a variable clash:
3x
Mx
Ex +
x
Mx
Ex = ?
In Kamp’s original version of discourse representation theory, and also in the extended version pre-
sented in Kamp and Reyle [16], this problem does not occur, for the algorithm presented there always
parses new sentences in the context of an existing representation structure, and for any indenite noun
phrase it encounters, it simply gives the instruction: ‘take a fresh variable.’ In other words, Kamp
never merges representation structures, for an extension of a discourse with a new sentence always
takes place in the context of a DRS.
If one is interested in constructing discourse representations in a bottom-up fashion, the picture
changes. In a bottom up approach, one can still represent a context as a DRS. A new sentence S is
processed by rst translating S into a DRS K, and next merging K with the context DRS. But how
should the DRSs be merged? There are various approaches to the merge problem for DRSs; see Van
Eijck and Kamp [10] for an overview. These strategies amount to various ways of avoiding destructive
assignments to variables, i.e., to various ways of arriving at structures which can be interpreted
monotonically in terms of an information ordering on the meanings of the representation structures.
In this paper we will argue that a variable free representation of dynamic logic leads to a very natural
monotonic interpretation, and thus to a natural approach to the merge problem. We get ‘fresh
variables’ for free if we replace the dynamic variable binding mechanism of dynamic predicate logic
with an indexing mechanism.
2. Dynamic Predicate Logic Without Variables
Predicate logics without variables have a long history. A key paper is Quine [20]. Based on this, Kuhn
[18] and Purdy [19] have proposed variable free representations for natural language understanding.
Based on an even older approach (Peirce’s existential graphs), Sanchez [21] has developed a variable
free natural logic. There is also a long tradition of variable free notation in lambda calculus: com-
binatory logic (see [2]) and De Bruijn indices [6] come to mind here. We will take our cue from this
tradition.
The De Bruijn notation for lambda calculus consists of replacing variables by indices that indicate
the distance to their binding lambda operator. The lambda term xy:(z:(y(zx))(yx) is written
in De Bruijn notation as :(:(2 (1 3))(1 2). This approach carries over to predicate logic in a
straightforward fashion. Rather than carry out the program in any detail we refer to Ben-Shalom [4]
(but note that the connection to De Bruijn is not mentioned there).
As an alternative to the De Bruijn style binding regime, where the binding quantier is found by
counting from the inside out, it is also possible to count from the outside in. This is similar to the
way lambdas are counted in Cartesian closed category models of the lambda calculus (see e.g. Gunter
[12, Ch. 3]; also Aczel [1]). Call this ‘reverse De Bruijn style.’
If X  N and X nite, then sup(X) is dened by:
sup(;) := 0;
sup(fng [ Y ) := max(n; sup(Y )):
Thus, sup(X) gives the maximum of X in case X is non-empty, 0 otherwise.
4The language L of variable free dynamic predicate logic consists of the union
S
n2N Ln, where each
Ln gives the formulas that assume a context of size n. Each formula is a pair (n; ), where n gives
the size of the context. The languages Ln are dened by simultaneous recursion, as follows.
Denition 1 (Terms and formulas of L)
v ::= 1 j 2 j   
L ::= (n;?)
j (n; 9)
j (n; Pv1    vm) provided supfv1; : : : ; vmg  n
j (n; v1 := v2) provided max(v1; v2)  n
j (n;:) provided (n; ) 2 L
j (n;?;) provided (n; ) 2 L
j (n; Pv1    vm;) provided (n; Pv1    vm) 2 L and (n; ) 2 L
j (n; v1 := v2;) provided (n; v1 := v2) 2 L and (n; ) 2 L
j (n; 9;) provided (n+ 1; ) 2 L
j (n;:(1);2) provided (n; 1) 2 L and (n; 2) 2 L
Note that we have built into the language that ; creates a flat list structure.
The language L has no individual constants. Such constants can easily be simulated by xing part of
the context, so this omission is without loss of generality.
We will omit unnecessary parentheses, writing (3;:(R2 3)) as 3;:R2 3, etcetera. Occasionally, we will
write 9; as 9. Also, we abbreviate :? as >, and :(1;    ;n;:n+1) as (1;    ;n)! n+1.
The static interpretation is replaced by a dynamic one. Let M = (M; I) be a rst order model, and
 an element of M. We use l() for the length of  2M, and [n] for the n-th element of . Then
the term interpretation with respect to M and  is given by (we use " for ‘undened’):
[[n]]M :=

[n] if n  l();
" otherwise.
In what follows, we will often extend a stack  2 M with a single value a 2 M . Notation for this:
 a^. Concatenation of two stacks ;  2 M, in that order, is written as  ^ . If ;  2 M we use
 v  for: there is a  2M with  ^ =  . It is easy to see that v is a partial order on M (reflexive,
transitive and anti-symmetric).
The reason why it is more convenient to use reverse De Bruyn indexing rather than regular De Bruyn
style is this. The key feature of dynamic anaphora logics is the ability of the existential quantier to
bind variables outside its proper scope. Consider the DPL text 9x;Px; 9y;Qy;Rxy. Here the x and
y of Rxy are bound outside of the proper scope by 9x and 9y respectively, so variables can be viewed
as anaphoric elements linked to a preceding existential quantier that introduces a referent. Similarly,
in DRT, the introduction of a reference marker
x
acts as an existential quantier with dynamic scope.
The regular De Bruijn analogue of the above DPL formula would be the following (we assume that
the anaphoric context is empty):
(0; 9;P1; 9;Q1;R2 1)
5The index 1 in P1 and the index 2 in R2 1 are bound by the same quantier (the leftmost occurrence
of 9). This illustrates that anaphoric coreference (or: dynamic binding) is no longer encoded by use of
the same index, but the antecedent of an index has to be worked out by taking the ‘existential depth’
of the intervening formula into account.
The awkwardness in antecedent recovery can be avoided by using reverse De Bruijn indexing. The
reverse De Bruyn analogue of the example 9x;Px; 9y;Qy;Rxy looks like this:
(0; 9;P1; 9;Q2;R1 2)
All occurrences of 1 are bound by the same quantier (the leftmost occurrence of 9), and similarly,
all occurrences of 2 are bound by the rightmost occurrence of 9.
The semantic denition of satisfaction, for dynamic logic without quantiers under the reverse De
Bruyn indexing scheme, runs as follows (A ranges over ?, Pv1    vn, v1 := v2, :()):
Denition 2 (Satisfaction for L)
[[n;?]]M never,
[[n; 9]]M i l() = n and  = ^a for some a 2M;
[[n; Pv1    vm]]M i l() = n;  =  and h[[v1]]M : : : ; [[vm]]M i 2 I(P );
[[n; v1
:= v2]]M i l() = n;  =  and [[v1]]
M
 = [[v2]]
M
 ;
[[n;:]]M i l() = n;  =  and there is no  2M with [[n; ]]M ;
[[n; 9;]]M i [[n; 9]]M and [[]]M for some  2M;
[[n;A;]]M i [[n;A]]
M
 and [[n; ]]
M
 :
Note that in the semantic clauses for (n; Pv1    vm) and (n; v1 := v2) the proviso l() = n guarantees
that the term functions [[vi]]M are well dened.
The denition of the semantics for L is in fact a straightforward adaptation of the dynamic semantics
for predicate logic dened in Groenendijk and Stokhof [11], which is in turn closely related to a
proposal made by Barwise in [3]. However, this semantics is not equivalent to the semantics given
by Groenendijk and Stokhof, but has an important advantage over it. In Groenendijk and Stokhof’s
semantics for DPL, a repeated assignment to a single variable by means of a repeated use of the
same existential quantier-variable combination blocks o the individual introduced by the rst use
of the quantier from further anaphoric reference. After 9xPx; 9xQx, the variable x will refer to the
individual introduced by 9xQx, and the individual introduced by 9xPx has become inaccessible.
In the sequence semantics proposed by Vermeulen [23] this problem is solved by making every variable
refer to a stack, and interpreting an existential quantication for variable x as a push operation on the
x stack. The quantication 9x now gets a counterpart xE, interpreted as a pop of the x stack. In our
reverse De Bruyn semantics for L we use a single nite stack, and we do not allow pops. This ensures
that existential quantication is non-destructive, in other words that our semantics is incremental.
The push stack operations are replaced by a single push operation (the interpretation of the existential
quantier). Note that quantications never can destroy previous dynamic assignments in the same
formula, nor can they overwrite initially given values. Indeed, the denition of the semantics for
L ensures that positions 1; : : : ; k of an L-formula (k; ) are not aected by the stack dynamics of
the existential quantier. The values of these positions are read from the input state; these are the
anaphoric references picked up from the surrounding context. Positions higher up on the ‘stack’
get their value from an existential quantier action inside . This is made formal in the following
proposition.
6Lemma 3 (Incrementality) If [[n; ]]M then  v  .
Proof. Induction on the structure of , with induction hypothesis of the form for all n 2 N, : : : .
2
The language L is designed for the translation of open texts: texts that may contain occurrences of
pronouns which take their reference from the surrounding context. After all, the process of picking
up antecedents from context is the essence of anaphoric linking.
For a translation from L to standard DPL we need a term translation  and a formula translation .
The term translation is given by n := xn. The formula translation (again, we let A range over ?,
Pv1    vn, v1 := v2, :()):
(n;?) := ?
(n; 9) := 9xn+1
(n; Pv1    vm) := Pv1    vm
(n; v1
:= v2) := v1
:= v2
(n;:()) := :(n; )
(n; 9;) := 9xn+1; (n+ 1; )
(n;A;) := (n;A); (n; ):
E.g., L-formula (2; 9;R(1; 3);S(2; 3)) gets translated by  into the DPL formula 9x3;Rx1x3;Sx2x3.
Note that the DPL translations of L formulas are rather special, for they will contain no destructive
assignments (all quantications are over ‘fresh’ variables).
To show that the translation function is correct in the sense that it preserves satisfaction of formulas,
assume a DPL language over a set of variables V = fxi j i 2 N+g. Then a DPL state over a model
M = (M; I) is a member of MV . We use M; s; s0 j=dpl  for: the state pair s; s0 satises the DPL
formula  in model M.
If s is a DPL state overM, and  2M we dene the state s as follows.
s(xi) :=

[i] if i  l();
s(xi) otherwise.
Proposition 4 For all (n; ) 2 L, all models M, all ;  2M, all s 2MV :
[[(n; )]]M i M; s; s j=dpl (n; ):
Proof. Induction on the structure of . Here is the existential quantier case.
[[(n; 9)]]M i l() = n and for some a 2 M ,  a^ =  i for all s 2 MV , s and s dier at most in
the value for xn+1 i M; s; s j=dpl 9xn+1 i M; s; s j=dpl (n; 9). 2
To illustrate the considerable expressive power of dynamic logic without variables, here is a translation
function from FOL to L. We assume a set of rst order variables V = fxi j i 2 N+g. If f is
an assignment to V in some domain M and  2 Mk, f is dened in the obvious way, by putting
f(xi) := [i] for i  k, f(xi) := f(xi) for i > k. For term translations, let 	 be the inverse of .
To translate a rst order formula , let k := supfi j xi 2 FV ()g. Then the L translation of  is
7(k; k), where the translation functions k, for k 2 N, are dened as follows:
(?)k := ?
(Pv1    vm)k := Pv	1    v	m
(:)k := :()k
(1 ^ 2)k := ::(1)k; (2)k
(9xi)k := 9; ([xk+1=xi])k+1:
The substitution [xk+1=xi] is subject to the usual condition that xk+1 should be free for xi in . If
necessary, replace  by an alphabetic variant that meets the condition.
Proposition 5 Let  be a FOL formula, and let k := supfi j xi 2 FV ()g.
For all models M = (M; I), all stacks  2Mk, all variable assignments f :
M; f j=  i there is a  with [[k; k]]M :
Proof. Induction on the structure of . The induction hypothesis of the form: suppose the property
holds for all subformulas  of , for all m with k  m  k+ d(), where d() measures the quantier
depth of . 2
Combining the well-known translation from DPL to FOL with the above translation, we get in two
steps a translation from DPL to L. Still, it is instructive to dene a direct translation. The xed
occurrences of variables in a DPL formula are the variable occurrences that are neither classically
bound nor in the dynamic scope of an existential quantier. Let  be a DPL formula, and let
k := supfi j xi has a xed occurrence in g. Then  translates into (k; (k)), with (k) given by:
(?)(k) := ?
(9xi)(k) := 9
(Pv1    vm)(k) := Pv	1    v	m
(v1
:= v2)(k) := v	1
:= v	2
(:)(k) := :()(k)
((1;2);3)(k) := (1; (2;3))(k)
(A;)(k) := A(k);(k)
(9xi;)(k) := 9; ([xk+1=xi])(k+1):
Here [xk+1=xi] denotes dynamic substitution, i.e., substitution of xk+1 for all occurrences of xi
that are neither classically or dynamically bound, while taking care, through appropriate switches to
alphabetic variants, that the replacing occurrences of xk+1 are dynamically free in the result (i.e., are
not in the dynamic scope of an existential quantier).
The following proposition can be proved by induction on the structure of :
Proposition 6 For all models M = (M; I), all  2 Mk, all s 2 V ! M , where V = fxi j i 2 N+g,
the following holds:
9t 2 V !M : M; s; t j=dpl  () 9 2M : [[k; (k)]]M :
83. Variable Free Dynamic Logic and Discourse Representation
Next, we want to show that L formulas correspond exactly to (canonical forms of) Discourse Rep-
resentation Structures in the sense of Kamp [15] (so-called pure DRSs). DRSs are dened by the
following mutual recursion. Again, we assume for simplicity that there are no individual constants
(and again, nothing hinges on this).
v ::= x1 j x2 j   
C ::= Pv1    vn j v1 := v2 j :D
D ::= (fv1; : : : ; vng; fC1; : : : ; Cmg)
If D = (fv1; : : : ; vng; fC1; : : : ; Cmg) and D0 are DRSs, then D ) D0 abbreviates the condition
:(fv1; : : : ; vng; fC1; : : : ; Cm;:D0g):
We give a translation function  from L formulas to DRSs, as follows (using (n; )0 and (n; )

1 for
the rst and second components of (n; )):
(n;?) := (;; f?g)
(n; 9) := (fxn+1g; ;)
(n; Pv1    vm) := (;; fPv1    vmg)
(n; v1
:= v2) := (;; fv1 := v2g)
(n;:()) := (;; f:(n; )g)
(n;?;) := (;; f?g)
(n; 9;) := (fxn+1g [ (n+ 1; )0 ; (n+ 1; )1 )
(n; Pv1    vm;) := ((n; )0 ; fPv1    vmg [ (n; )1 )
(n; v1
:= v2;) := ((n; )0 ; fv1 := v2g [ (n; )1 )
(n;:(); ) := ((n;  )0 ; f:(n; )g [ (n;  )1 ):
Some examples:
(2; R1 2; 9;R1 3) =
x3
Rx1x2
Rx1x3
(2; R1 2;:(9;R1 3)) =
Rx1x2
:
x3
Rx1x3
We will now show that the translation is adequate. Assume a model M = (M; I). An embedding
function in the sense of DRT is a function from a nite subset of the set of variables fxi j i 2 N+g
to M . We use  for the function in fx1; : : : xl()g ! M that corresponds to stack  2 M, in the
obvious sense (namely, by setting (xi) := [i]).
9Proposition 7 If (n; ) 2 L then:
1. (n; ) is a DRS.
2. [[n; ]]M i 
 veries (n; ) in M with respect to  (in the sense of DRT).
Proof. Both claims are proved by induction on the structure of . 2
The DRS translations have the additional property that they yield pure DRSs: If K 0 is a sub-DRS of
K then their sets of introduced markers will be disjoint.
A special case is the case of L formulas of the form (0; ). These correspond precisely to so-called
proper pure DRSs, i.e., pure DRSs without ‘xed’ variable occurrences.
a
To capture the precise meaning of ‘xed’ variables in a DRS, we need to distinguish three kinds of
variable occurrences in a DRS: (1) xed by the larger context, (2) xed in the current context, and
(3) xed in a subordinate context. Here are the denitions of these sets.
Denition 8 (x, intro, cbnd)
 x(fv1; : : : ; vng; fC1; : : : ; Cmg) :=
S
i x(Ci)− fv1; : : : ; vng.
 intro(fv1; : : : ; vng; fC1; : : : ; Cmg) := fv1; : : : ; vng.
 cbnd(fv1; : : : ; vng; fC1; : : : ; Cmg) :=
S
i cbnd(Ci).
 x(Pv1    vn) := fv1; : : : vng, intro(Pv1    vn) := ;, cbnd(Pv1    vn) := ;.
 x(v1 := v2) := fv1; v2g, intro(v1 := v2) := ;, cbnd(v1 := v2) := ;.
 x(:D) := x(D), intro(:D) := ;, cbnd(:D) := intro(D) [ cbnd(D).
We will now dene a translation from DRSs to L formulas, using a technique similar to the mapping
of FOL to L. Let D be a DRS, and let k be supfijxi 2 x(D)g. Then the L-translation of D is the
formula (k;D[k]), where the functions [k] are given by:
(;; fC1; : : : ; Cmg)[k] := C[k]1 ; : : : ;C[k]m
(fv1; : : : ; vng; fC1; : : : ; Cmg)[k] := 9; (fv2; : : : ; vng; f[xk+1=v1]C1; : : : ; [xk+1=v1]Cmg)[k+1]
(?)[k] := ?
(Pv1    vm)[k] := Pv	1    v	m
(v1
:= v2)[k] := v	1
:= v	2
(:)[k] := :()[k]:
Note that there is an element of indeterminism in this translation instruction, for fv1; : : : ; vng is a
set, and the translation recipe instructs us to take its elements one by one. If the reader does not like
this, she can use the order on fv1; : : : ; vng imposed by the indices of the variables to always pick the
smallest element from this set.
Again, we have to ensure that xk+1 is free for vi in [xk+1=vi]C, i.e., that xk+1 does not have contextu-
ally bound occurences in C. If this condition is not met, we have to replace C by an alphabetic variant
10
rst. For all purposes, contextually bound variables in DRT behave exactly like bound variables in
FOL. Note that xk+1 cannot have xed occurrences in C, by an inductive argument based on the fact
that the initial choice of index is the highest index of the initial set of xed occurrences, and that
xed occurrences of variables that are not in the initial set would have caused a variable clash at the
level where they got introduced.
For the next proposition, we have to relate embedding functions to stacks of elements of a domain. If
f is a function in fxi j 1  i  kg !M for some k 2 N, then f 2Mk is given by f[i] := f(xi).
Proposition 9 Let D be a DRS, and let k be supfi j xi 2 x(D)g. Then the following hold:
1. (k;Dk) 2 L,
2. For all models M = (M; I), all functions f : x(D)!M : there is a g : x(D) [ intro(D)!M
such that g veries D with respect to f in M (in the sense of DRT) i there is a  2 M with
f [[k;Dk]]M .
Proof. Both claims are proved by induction on the structure of D. 2
In this section we have shown that L and DRT have exactly the same expressive power. Moreover, L
formulas are isomorphic to DRSs in canonical form, in the following sense. L formulas correspond to
pure DRSs, and L formulas of the form (0; ) correspond to proper pure DRSs. The advantage of L
over DRT will reveal itself when we are going to dene logical consequence for L, in Section 5.
4. Merging Formulas and Merging Representation Structures
For the following we need the notion of the ‘existential depth’ of a formula. Intuitively, the existential
depth of (n; ) calculates the number of positions by which the stack grows during the semantic
processing of . E.g., the existential depth of (n; 9) is 1, for any n.
If (n; ) 2 L, the existential depth of  is given by (A ranges over ?, Pv1    vn, v1 := v2, :()):
e(9) := 1
e(A) := 0
e(9;) := 1 + e()
e(A;) := e():
Suppose we want to ‘merge’ two formulas (n; ) and (m; ) in left-to-right order, in such a way that
the output of (n; ) serves as input to (m; ). One could introduce a merge operation  as a partial
operation on L formulas, as follows:
(n; )  (m; ) :=

(n; ; ) if m = n+ e();
" otherwise.
In case the result of merging (n; ) and (m; ) is undened all is not lost, however. The undenedness
may be due to the fact that the context is too large (n+ e() > m) or to the fact that the context is
too small (n + e() < m). In the former case, the problem can be remedied by performing a ‘write
memory shift operation’ on (m; ), as follows:
(m; )
(m+ k; [m+k] )
Here, [m+k] is the index substitution which replaces every i > m by i+ k.
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Proposition 10 [[m; ]]M^ i for all  2Mk: ^[[m+ k; [m+k] ]]M^^ .
The other case where the result of merging (n; ) and (m; ), in that order, is undened, is the case
where the context is too small (n+ e() < m). In this case we can use ‘existential padding’. A useful
abbreviation for this is 9k, dened recursively by:
90 := >
9k+1 := 9; 9k
Existential padding is applied as follows:
(m+ k;  )
(m; 9k; )
Proposition 11 [[m; 9k; ]]M i ^ [m+1::m+k][[m+ k;  ]]M .
The rules for memory shift and existential padding are built into the calculus of Section 6.
As Propositions 7 and 9 have shown us, the variable free dynamic logic L can be viewed as a rational
reconstruction of DRT (in a way that DPL cannot be viewed as such). In fact, the reconstruction
has made us sensitive to a distinction which often remains implicit in DRT: the distinction between
representation structures which contain reference markers not introduced in the structure itself but
imported from a pre-existing representation on one hand and representation structures which do not
on the other (no reference markers are imported from outside; every marker gets introduced in the
structure itself).
The variable constraint imposed in DRT (always take fresh variables when extending a DRT structure)
avoids the destructive assignment problem from DPL, but the penalty imposed for this is a top-down
DRS construction algorithm. A bottom up perspective on the semantics reveals itself via the link
with the variable free notation.
Several possible solutions to the merge problem for DRT are discussed in Van Eijck and Kamp [10].
If one wants merge to be a total operation on DRSs, the merge of DRSs D and D0, in that order, may
involve substitution of the introduced variables ofD0. The present variable free perspective on dynamic
logic suggests a particular choice for the merge operation. The DRS translations of L-formulas have
the following general form (this is the general form of a pure DRS):
xm+1; : : : ; xn
C1
...
Ck
Here it is assumed that all the markers occurring in C1; : : : ; Ck are among x1; : : : ; xn. The mark-
ers x1; : : : ; xm are the xed markers of the DRS, the markers xm+1   xn the introduced reference
markers.
Assuming that DRSs are all in this canonical form, we can merge them as follows, using substitution
to avoid variable clashes:
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xp+1; : : : ; xp+m
C1
...
Ck
[xp+m+1=xq+1;::: ;xp+m+n=xq+n]
xq+1; : : : ; xq+n
C01
...
C0r
=)
xp+1; : : : ; xp+m+n
C1
...
Ck
C01[xp+m+1=xq+1; : : : ; xp+m+n=xq+n]
...
C0r[xp+m+1=xq+1; : : : ; xp+m+n=xq+n]
Example:
x2; x3
Rx1x2
Sx2x3
[x4=x3;x5=x4]
x3; x4
Tx1x4
V x3x4
=)
x2; x3; x4; x5
Rx1x2
Sx2x3
Tx1x5
V x4x5
This example corresponds to the merge of (1; 9; 9;R(1; 2);S(2; 3)) and (2; 9; 9;T (1; 4); V (3; 4)), in that
order, after memory shift right of the second formula over one position, to get (3; 9; 9;T (1; 5); V (4; 5)),
with end result:
(1; 9; 9;R(1; 2);S(2; 3); 9; 9;T (1; 5); V (4; 5):
The switch rules of the calculus of Section 6 permit to transform this in turn into:
(1; 9; 9; 9; 9;R(1; 2);S(2; 3);T (1; 5);V (4; 5);
which again corresponds to (a canonical, i.e., pure, representation of) the result DRS.
5. A Transitive Notion of Dynamic Consequence
A piece of text containing anaphoric references can either be self-contained, in case all anaphors nd
their antecedent in the text itself, or it can be linked to a context, in case some pronouns refer to an
antecedent outside the text itself, e.g. an antecedent mentioned in previous discourse, or introduced
by another speaker, or introduced by an act of pointing, and so on. We can say that texts of the latter
kind have an anaphoric presupposition. In order to establish the truth conditions of such a text one
needs access to the context that provides antecedents for the outward pointing anaphors, and in that
sense the anaphoric context is presupposed.
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Still, it is clear that we can make (minimal) sense of a piece of text containing unresolved anaphors,
even without access to the context. We can abstract from the context, in the usual way, by viewing the
meaning of a piece of text with anaphoric presupposition as a function from contexts to denotations.
The full information content of the text reveals itself once the anaphoric context is plugged in. As long
as the context is unknown, the anaphors with an outside link have the weakest possible information
content: they carry the same information as a wide scope existential quantier.
The modelling of anaphoric presupposition as existentially-quantied-over context, with this context
in turn treated as a piece of ‘read-only memory’, suggests a very natural consequence notion for
‘reasoning under anaphoric presupposition’.
The anaphoric presupposition of a formula (n; ) is given by its ‘oset’ n, for the number of anaphoric
elements that need (possibly) dierent outside referents. It should be noted, though, that not every
index i in f1; : : : ; ng need occur in . We can now say that (n; ) entails (m; ) i for all models,
the interpretation of (n; ) is ‘more informative’ than that of (m; ). The formula (n; ) will export
n+ e() anaphoric elements, for e() measures the number of new referents that are introduced by .
In order to ensure that all of these can be absorbed by (m; ), we have to assume that n+ e()  m.
Making the assumption n + e()  m into a presupposition boils down to the statement that if
n+ e() > m then it is vacuously false that (m; ) follows from (n; ). These considerations lead to
the following formal denition of logical consequence for L:
Denition 12 (L Consequence)
1. (n; ) j= (m; ) :() n+ e()  m and for all M; ;  : if [[n; ]]M then there are ;  with
 v  and [[m; ]]M .
2. (n; ) =j (m; ) : () n + e()  m and there are M; ;  with [[n; ]]M such that for no 
with  v  is there a  with [[m; ]]M .
This consequence relation is truly dynamic in that it allows carrying anaphoric links from premiss to
conclusion. For example: from ‘a man walks and he talks’ it follows that ‘he talks’:
(0; 9;M1;W1;T1) j= (1; T1):
The following lemma shows that L consequence has a very desirable property.
Lemma 13 (Transitivity) For all (n; ); (m; ); (k; ) 2 L:
If (n; ) j= (m; ) and (m; ) j= (k; ) then (n; ) j= (k; ).
Proof. Suppose (n; ) j= (m; ) and (m; ) j= (k; ), and assume [[n; ]]M . We have to show that
there are  and  with  v  and [[k; ]]M .
By (n; ) j= (m; ) and the assumption there are  0 w  and  with  0 [[m; ]]M . From this and
(m; ) j= (k; ) we get 0 w  and  with 0 [[k; ]]M . By incrementality and by transitivity of v, we
get  v 0 and we are done. 2
One of the problems with the dynamic consequence relation of DPL [11] is the fact that it is not
transitive, as witnessed by Van Benthem’s example:
Suppose a man owns a house. Then he owns a garden.
Suppose a man owns a garden. Then he sprinkles it.
BUT NOT: Suppose a man owns a house. Then he sprinkles it.
14
The example makes a point, not about this piece of natural language reasoning, but about the DPL
rendering of it:
9x;Mx; 9y;Hy;Oxy j=dpl 9z;Gz;Oxz.
9z;Gz;Oxz j=dpl Sxz.
9x;Mx; 9y;Hy;Oxy 6j=dpl Sxz.
The point of the example is that it shows that the DPL consequence relation j=dpl is not transitive.
Here j=dpl is dened by:  j=dpl  i for all M; ; 0: if M; ; 0 j=dpl  then there is some 00 with
M; 0; 00 j=dpl  .
The example can also be brought to bear on DRT, where it serves to illustrate that DRT consequence
is not transitive either:
x; y
Mx
Hy
Oxy
j=drt
z
Gz
Oxz
z
Gz
Oxz
j=drt Sxz
x; y
Mx
Hy
Oxy
6j=drt Sxz
If we use L-formulas, the situation looks better. The translation of Van Benthem’s example now runs:
(0; 9;M1; 9;H2;O1 2) j= (2; 9;G3;O1 3) (2; 9;G3;O1 3) j= (3; S1 3)
(0; 9;M1; 9;H2;O1 2) j= (3; S1 3)
This is indeed a valid argument, for the consequence notion of L is indeed transitive.
Note that in the denition of valid consequence for L existential padding is used to provide an an-
tecedent for the index 3. The conclusion should be read as:
Suppose a man owns a house. Then there is a thing which he sprinkles.
This is of course the conclusion one would expect.
The following proposition shows that we can always choose to make existential padding explicit:
Proposition 14 For all (n; ); (m; ) 2 L with n+ e()  m:
(n; ) j= (m; ) i (n; ) j= (n+ e(); 9k; ), where k = m− (n+ e()).
Proof. Induction on k. 2
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6. A Calculus for Incremental Dynamic Reasoning
In this section, we will give a set of sequent deduction rules for incremental dynamic reasoning. We
postpone the treatment of equality to Section 9.
We will write sequents as (n; ) =) (m; ), where =) is the sequent separator. Note that (n; ) =)
(m;?), for any m  n+ e(), expresses that (n; ) is inconsistent.
In the calculus we are about to present, we need some further notation for substitutions, in addition
to [m+k]. Recall that [
m
+k] is the substitution that replaces every index n > m by n+ k. This is useful
to create room for k new indices starting from position m+1. What we also need is an operation that
removes a gap after the substitution of a referent for an 9 that binds position m. The operation for
this is [m−1]; this replaces every index n > m by n− 1. Finally, [k=m] has the usual meaning: replace
index m by k everywhere. We abbreviate [m−1][k=m] as [k=m]− (‘substitute k for m and close the gap’).
And that’s all we need.
In the calculus, we use C, with and without subscripts, as a variable over contexts (formula lists
composed with ;, including the empty list). We extend the function e to contexts by stipulating that
e(C) = 0 if C is the empty list. Substitution is extended to contexts in a similar way. In the rules
below we will use T as an abbreviation of formulas  with e() = 0 (T for Test formula).
Structural Rules
Test Axiom
(n; T ) =) (n; T ) (n; T ) 2 L
Soundness of Test Axiom If [[n; T ]]M then  =  (because T is a test) and therefore  [[n; T ]]
M
 .
Thus, (n; T ) j= (n; T ).
Transitivity Rule
(n; ) =) (m; ) (m; ) =) (k; )
(n; ) =) (k; )
Soundness of Transitivity Rule This was established in Lemma 13.
Test Contraction Rules
(n;C1T ;TC2) =) (m;)
(n;C1TC2) =) (m;)
(n; ) =) (m;C1T ;TC2)
(n; ) =) (m;C1TC2)
Note that contraction does in general not hold for formulas which are not tests. For instance, 9; 9
puts two elements on the stack, 9 only one.
There is also a rule for left weakening. Due to the format where ; serves as the concatenation operator
for formulas, the rule for ; left does double duty as an antecedent weakening rule. See below. Succedent
weakening would be the step from (n; ) =) (m; ) to (n; ) =) (m;:(: ;:)). This is taken care
of by the negation rules.
Soundness of Test Contraction Rules Immediate from the fact that [[n; T ]]M = [[n; T ;T ]]M.
Test Swap Rules
(n;C1T1;T2C2) =) (m;)
(n;C1T2;T1C2) =) (m;)
(n; ) =) (m;C1T1;T2C2)
(n; ) =) (m;C1T2;T1C2)
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Soundness of Test Swap Rules Immediate from the fact that [[n; T1;T2]]M = [[n; T2;T1]]M.
9 Swap Rules
n;C1T ; 9 C2 =) (m;)
n;C19; ([k+1]T )C2 =) (m;)
k = n+ e(C1)
(n; ) =) (m;C1T ; 9 C2)
(n; ) =) (m;C19; ([k+1]T )C2)
k = m+ e(C1)
These rules allow us to pull 9 leftward through a test T , provided we increment the appropriate indices
in T .
Pulling 9 through a test T in the opposite direction is allowed in those cases where 9 does not bind
anything in T . Now we must adjust T by decrementing the appropriate indices:
(n;C19;TC2) =) (m;)
(n;C1([k−1]T ); 9 C2) =) (m;)
k = n+ e(C1); k + 1 not in T
(n; ) =) (m;C19;TC2)
(n; ) =) (m;C1([k−1]T ); 9 C2)
k = m+ e(C1); k + 1 not in T
Soundness of 9 Swap Rules Soundness of the rules for moving 9 to the left follows from the fact
that [[k; T ; 9]]M = [[k; 9; [k+1]T ]]M.
Soundness of the rules for moving 9 to the right follows from the fact that if index k + 1 does not
occur in T , then [[k; 9;T ]]M = [[k; ([k−1]T ); 9]]M.
Context Rules
Memory Shift Rules
(n; ) =) (m; )
(n+ 1; [n+1]) =) (m+ 1; [n+1] )
(n; ) =) (m; )
(n; ) =) (m+ 1; [m+1] )
Soundness of Memory Shift Rules Memory shift on lefthand side: If [[n; ]]M ^ then for all a 2M ,
^a[[n+ 1; [n+1]]]M a^^  . Soundness of memory shift on righthand side is established similarly.
Context Extension
(n; 9;) =) (m; )
(n+ 1; ) =) (m; )
The counterpart to the rule of context extension (i.e., context absorption) is the rule for introducing
an existential quantier in the antecedent (see the logical rules below).
What context extension and absorption express is that linking information to an outside context (of
which nothing further is known) is equivalent, for all purposes of reasoning, to assuming that your
information is existentially quantied over.
This is how one can make sense of a ongoing conversation about an unknown ‘he’: instead of asking
questions of identication that might interrupt the flow of the gossip one simply inserts an existential
quantier and listens to what is being said.
Soundness of Context Extension Follows from the fact that
[[n; 9;]]M i for some a 2M; ^a[[n+ 1; ]]M :
Logical Rules
The rule for 9 Left (the converse of context extension) is a special case of the rule ; Left. See below.
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9 Right
(n; ) =) (m; [k=m+1]− )
(n; ) =) (m; 9; )
This format is familiar from the Gentzen format of 9-right in standard predicate logic. Here is an
example application:
(1; R1 1;:(9;S1 2)) =) (1; R1 1;:(9;S1 2))
(1; R1 1;:(9;S1 2)) =) (1; 9;R1 2;:(9;S2 3))
R1 1;:(9;S1 2) equals [1=2]−(R1 2;:(9;S2 3)), so this is indeed a correct application of the rule.
Soundness of 9 Right Assume a model M with input and output assignments ;  such that
[[n; ]]M . Then by the soundness of the premiss there is a  w  and a  with
[[m; [k=m+1]− ]]M :
Let [[k]]M = a. Then, by the denition of the substitution [
k=m+1]−, ^a[[m + 1;  ]]M . It follows that
[[m; 9; ]]M . This proves n;  j= (m; 9; ).
; Left and Right
(n+ e();  ) =) (m;)
(n; ; ) =) (m;)
(n; ) =) (m; ) (n; ) =) (m;)
(n; ) =) (m; ; [m+e( )])
The rst of these does double duty as a left weakening rule. Antecedent weakening is always extension
on the lefthand side. This is because extension on the righthand-side might aect the stack. Weakening
with a test is valid anywhere in the antecedent; the swap rules account for that.
An example application of the rule for ; right is:
(1; R1 1) =) (1; 9;R1 2) (1; R1 1) =) (1; 9;R2 1)
(1; R1 1) =) (1; 9;R1 2; 9;R3 1)
Soundness of ; Left Suppose [[n; ; ]]M . Let 
0 :=  [1::e()]. Then 0 [[n + e();  ]]M . By the
soundness of the premiss, there are  w  and  with [[m;]]M . This establishes (n; ; ) j= (m;).
Soundness of ; Right Assume [[n; ]]M . Then by the soundness of the second premiss, there are
 w  and  with [[m;]]M . By Proposition 10, for any 0 2Me( ),
^0 [[m+ e( ); [m+e( )]]]
M
^0^
By the soundness of the rst premiss, combined with Lemma 3, there is a 0 2Me( ) with
[[m; ]]M^0 :
It follows that [[m; ; [m+e( )]]]
M
^0^. This establishes (n; ) j= (m; ; [m+e( )]).
: Left and Right
(n; ) =) (n+ e();  )
(n; ;: ) =) (m;?) m  n+ e()
(n; ; ) =) (m;?)
(n; ) =) (n+ e();: )
Soundness of : Left Assume [[n; ;: ]]M . Then [[n; ]]M and there is no  with  [[n+ e();  ]]M .
Contradiction with the soundness of the premiss. This establishes (n; ;: ) j= (m;?).
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Soundness of : Right Assume [[n; ]]M . Then by the soundness of the premiss, there is no  with
 [[n+ e();  ]]M . This establishes (n; ) j= (n+ e();: ).
Double Negation Rules
(n; ) =) (m;:: )
(n; ) =) (m; )
(n; ;:: ) =) (m;?)
(n; ; ) =) (m;?)
Soundness of Double Negation Rules For Double Negation Left, assume [[n; ]]M . Then by the
soundness of the premiss, for no  w  is there a  with
[[m;: ]]M :
In particular, we do not have [[m;: ]]M . Therefore, there is a  with
[[m; ]]M :
This establishes (n; ) j= (m; ). The soundness of Double Negation Right is established similarly.
This completes the presentation of the calculus. Since we have checked the soundness of the axioms
and rules as we went along, we have:
Theorem 15 The Calculus of Incremental Dynamic Reasoning is sound.
7. Some Derivable Rules for Incremental Dynamic Reasoning
We derive some extra rules that we need for the completeness reasoning in Section 8.
Proposition 16 (Contradiction Rule) The following rule is derivable:
(n; ;: ) =) (n+ e();:) (n; ;: ) =) (n+ e(); )
(n; ) =) (n+ e();  )
Proof. Consider the following derivations:
(n; ;: ) =) (n+ e();:) (n; ;: ) =) (n+ e(); )
(n; ;: ) =) (n+ e();:;) ; r
(n+ e();:) =) (n+ e();:) test axiom
(n+ e();:;::) =) (n+ e();?) :l
(n+ e();:;) =) (n+ e();?) dn
From these two, by transitivity, we get (n; ;: ) =) (n+ e();?). From this, we derive the desired
conclusion as follows:
(n; ;: ) =) (n+ e();:) (n; ;: ) =) (n+ e(); )
(n; ;: ) =) (n+ e();?) see above
(n; ) =) (n+ e();:: ) :r
(n; ) =) (n+ e();  ) dn
2
Proposition 17 (Cases Rule) The following rule is derivable:
(n; ;: ) =) (n+ e(); ) (n; ;:: ) =) (n+ e(); )
(n; ) =) (n+ e(); )
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Proof.
(n; ;: ) =) (n+ e(); )
(n; ;: ;:) =) (n+ e();?) :l
(n; ;:;: ) =) (n+ e();?) swap
(n; ;:) =) (n+ e();:: ) :r
(n; ;:: ) =) (n+ e(); )
(n; ;:: ;:) =) (n+ e();?) :l
(n; ;:;:: ) =) (n+ e();?) swap
(n; ;:) =) (n+ e();::: ) :r
(n; ) =) (n+ e(); ) contrad
2
Proposition 18 (Ex Falso Rule) The following rule is derivable:
(n;?) =) (n; )
Proof.
(n;?) =) (n;?) start
(n;:;?) =) (n;?) ; l
(n;?;:) =) (n;?) swap
(n;?) =) (n;::) :r
(n;?) =) (n; ) dn
2
Proposition 19 (Inconsistency Rule) The following rule is derivable:
(n; ) =) (m;?)
(n; ) =) (m; )
Proof.
(n; ) =) (m;?) (m;?) =) (m; ) ex falso
(n; ) =) (m; ) tr
2
Proposition 20 (Modus Ponens) The following rule is derivable:
(n; ) =) (n+ e(); (:: )! ) (n; ) =) (n+ e();  )
(n; ) =) (n+ e(); )
Proof.
(n;  =) (n+ e();:(:: ;:)))
(n; ;::(:: ;:)) =) (n+ e();?) :l
(n; ;:: ;:) =) (n+ e();?) dn
(n; ;:: ) =) (n+ e();::) :r
(n; ;:: ) =) (n+ e(); ) dn
(n; ) =) (n+ e();  )
(n; ;: ) =) (n+ e();?) :r
(n; ;: ) =) (n+ e(); ) incons
(n; ) =) (n+ e(); ) cases
2
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8. Completeness of the Calculus
To establish the completeness of the calculus, assume that (0; ) 6=) (m; ). If m < e(), the
denition of L consequence immediately yields that (0; ) 6j= (m; ), so we may assume that m  e().
By proposition 14, we may also assume without loss of generality that m = e().
Because of the context extension rule, our assumption that the context is initially empty is harmless.
For suppose it is not, and we have that (n; ) 6=) (m; ) for n 6= 0. Then by context extension also
(0; 9n;) 6=) (m; ).
We will construct a countermodel by a slight modication of the standard Henkin construction for the
completeness of classical predicate logic. It is convenient to use k for e() throughout the reasoning
that follows. Also, in the following, we extend the language with individual constants.
Denition 21 A set of L formulas is k-bounded if every member of the set is in Lk (i.e., every
formula in the set has the form (k; )). We use (k;Γ) to refer to k-bounded sets of formulas.
 ‘Γ  :, there are (k; 1); : : : ; (k; n) 2 (k;Γ) with (0; ;::1;    ;::n) =) (k;  ).
(k;Γ) is consistent with (0; ) if there is a (k;  ) with  6‘Γ  .
(k;Γ) is negation complete with respect to (0; ) if for every (k;  ) 2 L either  ‘Γ  or  ‘Γ : .
(k;Γ) has witnesses for (0; ) if for every (k; 9; ) such that  ‘Γ 9; there is a c for which (k;::9 !
[c=k+1]− ) 2 (k;Γ).
Note that in the denition of  ‘Γ  the extra premisses from Γ do not extend the ‘anaphoric context’:
the context change potential of the premisses from Γ is blocked o by means of double negation signs.
Proposition 22 If  6‘Γ  then at least one of (k;Γ) [ f(k;  )g, (k;Γ) [ f(k;: )g is consistent with
(0; ).
Proof. Use the Cases Rule. 2
Let (k; 9;1); : : : be a list of all k-bounded formulas of L that start with 9. Let C0 := c01; : : : be a list
of fresh individual constants. Let L0 be L(C0) (the result of adding the constants C0 to L).
(k;0) := f(k;::9i ! [c0i =k+1]−i) j i 2 N+g:
Let (k; 9m1 ); : : : be a list of all k-bounded existential formulas which occur in Lm. Let Cm+1 :=
cm+11 ; : : : be a list of fresh individual constants. Let Lm+1 := Lm(Cm+1).
(k;m+1) := f(k;::9m+1i ! [c
m+1
i =k+1]−m+1i ) j i 2 N+g:
Let C :=
S
m Cm, and let (k;) be the set of L(C) formulas given by:
(k;) :=
[
m
(k;m):
Proposition 23 If (k;Γ) consists of L(C) formulas, and (k;Γ)  (k;), then (k;Γ) has witnesses
for (0; ).
Proof. Take some (k; 9 ) with  ‘Γ 9 . Then 9 2 Lm for some m. So there is some c 2 C with
::9 ! [c=k+1]− 2 m+1. So (k;::9 ! [c=k+1]− ) 2 (k;)  (k;Γ). 2
Proposition 24 If (k;Γ) has witnesses for (0; ) and  ‘Γ 9 , then there is some c 2 C with
 ‘Γ [c=k+1]− .
Proof. By the fact that Modus Ponens is a derivable rule (Proposition 20). 2
Proposition 25 If (k;Γ) is consistent with (0; ) then there is a (k;Γ0)  (k;Γ) which is consistent
with (0; ), negation complete with respect to (0; ), and has witnesses for (0; ).
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Proof. Assume (k;Γ) consistent with (0; ). Let (k; 1); : : : ; (k; i); : : : be an enumeration of all
k-bounded formulas of the language L(C). Extend (k;Γ) as follows to a (k;Γ0) with the required
properties.
(k;Γ0) := (k;Γ) [ (k;)
(k;Γm+1) :=

(k;Γm [ fmg) if (k;Γm [ fmg) consistent with (0; );
(k;Γm) otherwise.
(k;Γ0) := (k;
[
m
Γm)
(k;Γ0)  (k;), so by Proposition 23 (k;Γ0) has witnesses for (0; ).
Assume (k;Γ0) is inconsistent with (0; ). Then some (k;Γm) has to be inconsistent with (0; ) and
contradiction with Proposition 22. So (k;Γ0) is consistent with (0; ).
Finally, (k;Γ0) is negation complete by construction. 2
Denition 26 (Canonical Model) Let (k;Γ) be consistent with (0; ), be negation complete with
respect to (0; ), and have witnesses for (0; ). Then MΓ = (D; I) is dened as follows. D := the set
of natural numbers f1; : : : ; kg together with the set of constants C occurring in Γ[fg. For all terms
of the language, let I(t) := t. Let I(P ) := fht1; : : : ; tki j  ‘Γ Pt1    tk)g (where it is given that all
the ti are either constants or indices in the range 1; : : : ; k).
Lemma 27 (Satisfaction Lemma) Let (k;Γ) be consistent with (0; ), be negation complete with
respect to (0; ), and have witnesses for (0; ). For all k-bounded :
 ‘Γ  i 9 with h1::ki[[k; ]]MΓh1::ki^ .
Proof. Induction on the structure of .
 6‘Γ ? by the fact that (0; ) is consistent and Γ is consistent with (0; ).
 ‘Γ 9 by the fact that, as (0; ) is consistent and Γ is consistent with (0; ), we have  ‘Γ >, and
therefore by 9r,  ‘Γ 9;>.
 ‘Γ Pt1    tn i ht1::tni 2 I(P ) i h1::ki[[k; Pv1    vn]]MΓh1::ki.
 ‘Γ : i (Γ negation complete)  6‘Γ  i (i.h.) there is no  with h1::ki[[k; ]]MΓ i (semantic clause
for :) h1::ki[[k;:]]MΓh1::ki.
 ‘Γ 9 i (Γ has witnesses)  ‘Γ [c=k+1]− i (i.h.) there is a  with h1::ki[[k; [c=k+1]−]]MΓh1::ki^ i
h1::ki[[k; 9]]MΓh1::ki^c^ .
The nal case we have to deal with is A; , where A ranges over ?, Pt1    tn, :0. In this case, we
have:  ‘Γ A;  i (A is a test)  ‘Γ A and  ‘Γ  i (i.h. twice, plus the fact that A is a test)
h1::ki[[k;A]]
MΓ
h1::ki and there is a  with h1::ki[[k; ]]
MΓ
h1::ki^ i there is a  with h1::ki[[k;A; ]]
MΓ
h1::ki^ . 2
Proposition 28 Let (k;Γ) be consistent with (0; ), be negation complete with respect to (0; ), and
have witnesses for (0; ). Then [[0; ]]MΓh1::ki.
Proof. Let 9k0 be the result of applying the rule for moving 9 leftward as many times as necessary
to  to ensure that e(0) = 0. Then (0; ) and the formula (0; 9k0) are proof equivalent. Furthermore,
we have:
(k; 0) =) (k; 0) test axiom
(0; 9k0) =) (k; 0) 9l; k times
(0; ) =) (k; 0) swap rules
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Therefore,  ‘Γ 0, and by the satisfaction lemma, h1::ki[[k; 0]]MΓh1::ki. Also, by denition of the semantics
for 9, we have that [[0; 9k]]MΓh1::ki. By the semantic equivalence of  and 9k0 we get [[0; ]]MΓh1::ki. 2
Theorem 29 (Completeness) If (n; ) j= (m; ) then (n; ) =) (m; ).
Proof. Assume (n; ) 6=) (m; ). Without loss of generality we may assume that (n; ) 6=) (k;  ),
where k := n + e(), because from (n; ) =) (k;  ) it follows by a suitable number of applications
of memory shift on the righthand side that (n; ) =) (m; 0), where  0 is the result of shifting the
‘write registers’ of  to the right.
By context extension, it follows from (n; ) 6=) (k;  ) that (0; 9n) 6=) (k;  ). Set 0 := 9n. Then
k = e(0), and f(k;: )g is consistent with (0; 0). By proposition 25, there is a (k;Γ)  f(k;: )g
which is consistent with (0; 0), is negation complete with respect to (0; 0), and has witnesses for
(0; 0). Construct the canonical model and apply the satisfaction lemma to get:
h1::ki[[k;: ]]MΓh1::ki:
By the semantic clause for negation we have that for all  :
h1::ki; ) =2 [[k;  ]]MΓ :
By proposition 28:
[[0; 0]]MΓh1::ki:
This proves (0; 0) 6j= (k;  ), i.e., (0; 9n;) 6j= (k;  ), and therefore, (n; ) 6j= (k;  ). 2
9. Anaphoric Reasoning with Equality
Anaphoric linking makes extensive use of equality. See Van Eijck [8] for an in-depth analysis of the use
of equality in anaphoric descriptions. An anaphoric denite description like the garden can be treated
as a deniteness quantier followed by a link to a contextually available index. The translation of He
sprinkles the garden would then be something like 2;  : (3 := 2;G3);S1 3. Also, the determiner an other
often has an implicit anaphoric element. In such cases, the treatment involves non-identity links to
contextually available referents. He met an other woman gets a translation like 2; 9; 3 6= 2;W3;M1 3.
Below we indicate how to handle equality, while leaving the axiomatisation of deniteness in the
present framework for another occasion.
The following rules must be added to the calculus to deal with equality statements (we now assume
the presence of a set Cons of individual constants):
Reflexivity Axiom
(n; ) =) (m; t := t) n+ e()  m; t 2 Cons [ f1; : : : ;mg
Soundness of Reflexivity Axiom The axiom expresses that equality is reflexive.
Substitution Rule
(n; ) =) (m; [t1=t2 ] )
(n; ; t1
:= t2) =) (m; ) t1; t2 2 Cons [ f1; : : : ;mg
Example application:
(0;>) =) (0; a := a) refl
(0; a := b) =) (0; b := a) subst
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For the correctness of this application, note that a := a is of the form [a=b]b
:= a.
(0; a := b) =) (0; a := b) test axiom
(0; a := b; b := c) =) (0; a := c) subst
For the correctness of this application, note that a := b is of the form [b=c]a
:= c.
(3; 1 := 2) =) (3; 1 := 2) test axiom
(3; 1 := 2; 2 := 3) =) (3; 1 := 3) subst
(0; 9; 9; 9; 1 := 2; 2 := 3) =) (3; 1 := 3) 9l; 3 times
Soundness of the Substitution Rule Assume [[n; ; t1
:= t2]]M . Then [[n; ]]
M
 , and [[t1]]
M
 = [[t2]]
M
 .
By the soundness of the premiss, there are  w  and  with [[m; [t1=t2 ] ]]M . Therefore, [[m; ]]M .
This shows (n; ; t1
:= t2) j= (m; ).
The completeness of the anaphoric calculus with equality is proved by modifying the Henkin construc-
tion in the usual way (taking equivalence classes of terms under provable equality as elements of the
canonical model).
10. Conclusion
Semanticists sympathetic to DRT do not tend to worry about the top down construction algorithm
for DRSs, with a novelty condition to ensure incrementality of interpretation. Those interested in
carrying out a Montagovian or Fregean enterprise of building representations for complex constituents
out of representations for its components insist on the formulation of a bottom up procedure, how-
ever. This has led to the emergence of various dynamic logics intended as rational reconstructions of
the DRT programme. Unfortunately, the most well known of these, DPL, has a problem of destruc-
tive assignment, and is therefore not the best candidate for a reformulation of DRT in Fregean or
Montagovian terms. This flaw is remedied in the present proposal.
When looking at the general picture of dynamic reconstruction proposals for DRT, what may emerge
is that there is no single ‘best’ reconstruction, but that various proposals shed light on dierent aspects
of the dynamics of text processing that all merit study in their own right. The present ‘calculus of
incremental dynamics’ focusses on the abstraction over anaphoric context in reasoning. It gives an
explicit account of anaphoric links between premisses and conclusion in reasoning, and is more well
behaved than previous DRT calculi because of its match with a transitive consequence relation. To be
sure, the present sequent approach to axiomatising dynamic logics can also be used to get still closer
to standard DRT, or to axiomatize DPL and its variants: see the proof systems that are given in Van
Eijck [9].
To wind up our story we mention some connections to related work. Via the translation to DRT in
Section 3 (proposition 7) we have a proof system for (a streamlined version of) DRT. The calculus
makes the discipline of using and modifying the anaphoric context and of handling dynamically bound
indices fully explicit. It can be viewed as a proof system for ‘pure’ DRSs, a proof system that avoids
the award reference to alphabetic variance in the rules of proof proposed in Kamp and Reyle [17].
The present calculus diers from the earlier proof system for DRT by Saurer [22] in the fact that it
does not rely on an implicit translation to FOL.
Finally we mention the connections with Dekker [7], where a similar plea is made for incremental
dynamics but the problem of a calculus for reasoning is not addressed, with Visser and Vermeulen [24]
and Visser [26, 25], and with Blackburn and Venema [5] and Hollenberg [14]. To see the connection
with Hollenberg’s equational axioms of dynamic negation and relational composition, note that these
are all derivable in the calculus of incremental dynamics (as of course they should be).
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